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INTRODUCTION

In Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., Ithe Supreme Court held that
the states may be held liable for damages in private suits under
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA),2 as amended by the
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986
(SARA). 3 The Court in Union Gas was faced with two issues: (1)
whether the language of CERCLA, as amended by SARA, indicated a clear congressional intent to provide a private cause of
action against the states; and, (2) whether Congress has the power
to strip the states of their eleventh amendment protection when
4
legislating pursuant to its article I commerce clause power.
These issues so divided the Court that a different five-to-four split
on each issue made up the decision of the Court. 5
The first issue presented is simply one of statutory construction- whether the statutory language involved indicates congressional intent to allow a private cause of action against the states.
The importance of this issue is the degree of specificity with
which the members of the Court believe Congress must speak
when stripping the states of their sovereign immunity6 provided
1. 109 S. Ct. 2273 (1989).
2. Act of Dec. 11, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified as
amended 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
3. Act of Oct. 17, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (codified in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (Supp. IV 1986)).
4. Union Gas, 109 S.Ct. at 2277. The commerce clause of article I provides:
"The Congress shall have the Power . . . to regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes .... " U.S.
CoNST. art. 1, § 8. This power has been construed expansively. See, e.g., Hodel v.
Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 276 (1981).
The Court in Union Gas was presented with a third issue: Whether to overrule the century-old decision in Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890), which
interpreted the eleventh amendment to bar the federal courts from entertaining
suits against the states involving federal questions. The plurality of the Court,
however, avoided this issue by finding Pennsylvania liable under CERCLA, as
amended by SARA, on other grounds. Union Gas, 109 S.Ct. at 2286.
5. First, on the issue of whether Congress had clearly indicated its intent to
strip the states of their eleventh amendment immunity: (a) Justices Brennan,
Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens, and Scalia believed that Congress had indicated its
intent; while (b) the Chief Justice and Justices White, O'Connor, and Kennedy
believed that it had not. Second, on the issue of whether Congress had the
power to do this under its article I commerce clause power: (a) Justice Brennan,
Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens, and White believed that it did; while (b) the Chief
Justice and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy believed that it did not.
6. The doctrine of sovereign immunity stems from the general rule that the
King could not be sued in his own courts. SeeJ. LOCKE, FIRST TREATISE OF Gov-

ERNMENT $ 8 (1690); Massey, State Sovereignty and the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 61, 87-97 (1989) ("At least four hundred years before
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the states under the eleventh amendment.7 Through a line of decisions, a plurality of the Court had held that Congress must
speak with "unmistakably clear language" before it will be found
to have stripped states of their immunity." The majority's opinion in Union Gas, however, suggests that five members of the
Court require something less.9
The second issue involves the fundamental principles of federalism upon which our dualistic system of government was
formed. When the states created the federal government, they
created a limited government, reserving to themselves all other
powers: "The powers not delegated to the Untied States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to
the States respectively, or to the people."' 0 Hence, the federal
courts' jurisdiction under article III is limited to hearing only certain cases." A plurality of the Court in Union Gas reaffirmed a
line of prior decisions 12 which held that, despite the federal
courts' limited jurisdiction, the states consented to certain suits in
federal court when they gave Congress the power to legislate
under the commerce clause.' 3 Thus, when Congress, pursuant to
its commerce clause powers, specifically indicates its intent to
provide a private cause of action for damages against the states,
the states are amendable to suit in federal court.
The Union Gas decision is significant for two reasons. First, by
holding that the federal courts may entertain private suits against
the first English colonization of America, during the reign of Henry III, English
common law held that, while the king could not be sued in his own courts, he
was obliged, as the source of justice, to redress wrongs done to his subjects
under color of royal authority. This obligation was partly moral and partly legal,

but not susceptible to judicial enforcement.") (citing 9 W.
TORY OF

HOLDSWORTH, A His-

ENGuSH LAW 8 (3d ed. 1926)).

7. The eleventh amendment bars federal courts from hearing certain cases
and has long been characterized as an embodiment of the states' sovereign immunity, which goes beyond the literal words of the amendment. See, e.g., Hans v.
Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). For the text of the eleventh amendment, see infra
note 26 and accompanying text.
8. See Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 478
(1987).
9. While the plurality asserted that the language of CERCLA, as amended
by SARA, did provide an unmistakably clear indication of Congress's intent to
provide a cause of action against the states, this author finds that the language is
not so unmistakably clear.
10. U.S. CONST. amend X.
11. For the text of article III, see infra note 20 and accompanying text.
12. See Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184 (1964); Employees v. Missouri
Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279 (1973); Welch v. Texas Dep't of
Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468 (1987).
13. Union Gas, 109 S.Ct. at 2281.
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the states for damages under CERCLA, as amended by SARA, the
4
Court has paved the way for potentially enormous state liability. '
Considering that there are presently more than 1,200 hazardouswaste sites listed, with cleanup complete on only thirty-six,' 5 the
decision will almost certainly subject the states to substantial liability.' 6 And second, the case provided an opportunity for the
Court's two newest members to express their views on the difficult issues surrounding the eleventh amendment. These newest
members have affirmed the Court's trend away from a new-found
7
federalism and toward a strengthened state sovereignty.'
This article first considers the historical development of the
eleventh amendment and the federal courts' jurisdiction immediately prior to the Court's decision in Union Gas. The article then
examines the Union Gas decision, focusing on each issue and the
various opinions on that issue. And finally, this article analyzes
the Union Gas decision and suggests some alternatives.
II.

THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF ELEVENTH
AMENDMENT

Speaking on the Supreme Court, Chief Justice Marshall observed: "It is most true that this court will not take jurisdiction if
it should not: but it is equally true, that it must take jurisdiction if
it should.""' Although this passage is inaccurate today since the
Chief Justice was referring to the Supreme Court, which hears
cases today solely within its discretion by writ of certiorari, the
passage is an accurate characterization of the lower federal courts'
jurisdiction. 19
14. The potential for liability under CERCLA is enormous. See, e.g., Simon,
Deals that Smell Bad, FORBES, May 15, 1989 at 49 ("The estimated cost of cleaning
up the nation's 10,000-plus toxic waste dumps: a staggering $500 billion over
the next 50 years.... Cleanup costs can run anywhere from $100,000 to $500
million or more per site, depending on the type of waste and the extent of the
problem, and how it is cleaned up.").
15. Philadelphia Inquirer, June 15, 1989, § A, at 3, col. 2. See also Easterbrook, Cleaning Up, NEWSWEEK, July 24, 1989, at 26 ("Of the 1,224 sites on the
formal Superfund inventory, just 27 have been 'delisted' as fully clean.").
16. In addition to those sites presently listed, some 30,000 possible cleanup
sites have been identified. Philadelphia Inquirer,June 15, 1989, § A, at 3, col. 2.
17. Both Justices Scalia and Kennedy, along with the ChiefJustice and Justice O'Connor, would affirm the result in Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890),
and would overrule the decision in Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184 (1964).
Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2296-99 & 2202-03.
18. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821).
19. See Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S.
800, 817 (1976) (there exists a "virtually unflagging obligation of the federal
courts to exercise the jurisdiction given them."). Conversely, the federal courts
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The federal courts' nine bases of jurisdiction are specifically
set forth in article III of the Constitution:
The judicial power shall extend [1] to all Cases, in Law
and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of
the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under their Authority; [2] to all Cases affecting
Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls; [3] to
all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction; [4] to
Controversies to which the United States shall be a
Party; [5] to Controversies between two or more States;
[6] between a State and Citizens of another State; [7] between Citizens of different States; [8] between Citizens
of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and [9] between a State, or the Citizens
20
thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
When the Supreme Court considered the scope of article III
in Chisholm v. Georgia,2 1 it read the plain language of jurisdictional
base number six to permit federal courts to entertain actions between a state and citizens of another state.2 2 Considering that the
language of article III provides that federal jurisdiction extends to
cases "between a State and Citizens of another State," 23 the
Court's decision might appear to be a fair reading of that language. The several states, however, reacted quickly to the
Chisholm decision2 4 and adopted the eleventh amendment, effecmay not exercise jurisdiction if it is improper. See FED.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3)
("Whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court
lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action.").
Somewhere in between exist suits over which the federal courts have proper
jurisdiction, but should abstain from hearing the case. See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 53 (1971) (federal courts should abstain from enjoining state
criminal prosecutions except in extraordinary circumstances); Railroad Comm'n
of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 501 (1941) (federal courts should abstain
from hearing case involving an unsettled issue of state law, the resolution of
which would avoid a federal constitutional issue).
20. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. The numbers included in the text of article III
indicate the federal courts' nine jurisdictional bases and are referred to by
number throughout this article.
21. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
22. Id. at 450. The five Justices sitting in Chisholm each wrote a separate
opinion, with only Justice Iredell dissenting.
23. U.S. CONST. art. I1, § 2.
24. Justice Brennan chronologizes the events following the Court's decision in Chisholm in his dissent in Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234
(1985). In his dissent, Justice Brennan points out that the Chisholm decision was
handed down on February 18, 1793, and a resolution was introduced the next
day in the House of Representatives, which provided:
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25
tively reversing that decision.
As ultimately ratified, the eleventh amendment provides:

The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced
or prosecuted against one of the United States by [1] Citizens of another State, or [2] by Citizens or Subjects of
26
any Foreign State.
"[N]o State shall be liable to be made a party defendant in any of the
Judicial Courts established or to be established under the authority of
the United States, at the suit of any person or persons, citizens or foreigners, or of any body politic or corporate whether within or without
the United States."
Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 283-84 (quoting I C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN
UNrrED STATES HISTORY 101 (rev. ed. 1937)).
The following day, February 20, 1793, another resolution was introduced in
the Senate, which provided: " 'The Judicial power of the United States shall not
extend to any suits in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of
the United States by citizens of another State, or by citizens or subjects of any
foreign State.'" Id. at 284 (quoting 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 651-52 (1793)).
On January 2, 1794, a resolution was introduced in the Senate which contained the language of the eleventh amendment as ultimately ratified. That resolution simply added three words to the resolution introduced on February 20,
1793: " 'The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to
any suits in law or equity .... ." Id. at 285 (quoting 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 25
(1794) (emphasis added indicating new material)). Two theories for the added
"be construed to" language have been advanced: (1) To "rebuke the Supreme
Court for its construction of the words 'between a State and citizens of another

State' in Chisholm"; and, (2) to "assure the retrospective application of the Eleventh Amendment." Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 288 (Brennan,J., dissenting) (respectively citing Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow
Construction of an Affirmative Grant ofJurisdiction Rather than a Prohibition Against Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1033, 1061-62 (1983); C. JACOBS, THE ELEVENTH
AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 68-69 (1972)). See also Massey, supra note

6, at 111-20.
25. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 11 (1889) ("This amendment, expressing the will of the ultimate sovereignty of the whole country, superior to all
legislatures and all courts, actually reversed the decision of the Supreme Court
[in Chisholm]"). See also Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483
U.S. 468, 480 (1987) (quoting Employees v. Missouri Dep't of Pub. Health &
Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 291 (1973) (Marshall, J., concurring)); Pennhurst State
School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 97 (1984) ("The decision [in
Chisholm] 'created such a shock of surprise that the Eleventh Amendment was at
once proposed and adopted.' ") (quoting Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313,
325 (1934)).
26. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. The numbers included in the text of the eleventh amendment indicate the two jurisdictional bases that the amendment explicitly repealed.
The eleventh amendment was designed primarily to avoid states being sued
by citizens of other states for debt obligations incurred during the Revolutionary
War. See, e.g., Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 264 (1985)

(Brennan, J., dissenting); Massey, supra note 6, at 64. As Charles Warren
observed:
In the crucial condition of the finances of most of the States at that
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Reaction to the Court's decision in Chisholm was so alacritous
because many believed that such a result was not possible in the
dualistic system created under the Constitution.2 7 Despite the
plain language of article III, many believe that the federal courts
were not given the power under the Constitution to entertain
suits against the states and that the eleventh amendment simply
corrected this erroneous interpretation in Chisholm. 2 8 In other
words, many believe that the states never intended to surrender
time, only disaster was to be expected if suits could be successfully
maintained by holders of State issues of paper and other credits, or by
Loyalist refugees to recover property confiscated or sequestered by the
States; and that this was no theoretical danger was shown by the immediate institution of such suits against the States in South Carolina,
Georgia, Virginia and Massachusetts.

1 C.

WARREN,

supra note 24, at 99.

27. The most frequently quoted passage in support of this proposition is
Alexander Hamilton's Federalist Paper Number 81. See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan,
415 U.S. 651, 661-62 n.9 (1974); Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 324-25
(1934); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1890). For the text of Hamilton's
Federalist Paper Number 81, see infra note 53.
The Court in Edelman buttressed this conclusion by observing:
"The right of the Federal Judiciary to summon a State as defendant and
to adjudicate its rights and liabilities had been the subject of deep apprehension and of active debate at the time of the adoption of the Constitution; but the existence of any such right had been disclaimed by
many of the most eminent advocates of the new Federal Government,
and it was largely owing to their successful dissipation of the fear of the
existence of such Federal power that the Constitution was finally
adopted."
Id. at 660 (quoting I C. WARREN, supra note 24, at 91).
28. See, e.g., Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S.
468, 480 (1987). The Court in Welch quoted Justice Marshall's separate opinion
in Employees v. Missouri Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279 (1973),
which provided that "[it had been widely understood prior to ratification of the
Constitution that the provisions in Art. III, § 2, concerning 'Controversies ...
between a State and Citizens of another State' would not provide a mechanism
for making States unwilling defendants in federal court." Welch, 483 U.S. at 479
(quoting Employees, 411 U.S. at 291-92 (Marshall, J., concurring)). See also Hans
v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 14 (1890). Justice Marshall has changed his position
since he wrote in Employees and now believes that there was no such common
understanding. See, e.g., Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 247
(1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall, J.).
Present thinking among many scholars is that a majority of those commenting on this subject prior to the Constitution being ratified believed that the
states were amenable to suit in federal court. See, e.g., Marshall, Fighting the Words
of the Eleventh Amendment, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1342, 1349-50 n.30 (1989) (noting
that "[elven the pro-Hans members of the Court now seem to agree that there is
no clear evidence of a consensus about article III's effect on state sovereign immunity.") (citing Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S.
468, 483-84 (1987) ("At most, then, the historical materials show that- to the
extent this question was debated- the intentions of the framers and Ratifiers
were ambiguous.")); C. JACOBS, supra note 24, at 40; Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines: Part One, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 515, 521
(1977).
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their sovereign immunity when creating the federal judiciary
under article 111.29

When the language of the eleventh amendment and article
III is compared, it would appear that the eleventh amendment
was designed to repeal two of article III's jurisdictional bases.3 0
Jurisdictional bases six and nine of article III extend the jurisdiction of the federal courts to controversies "between a State and
Citizens of another State" and "between a State ... and foreign
States, Citizens or Subjects." 3' The eleventh amendment parallels the language of article III by stripping the federal courts of
the power to hear cases against a state by "Citizens of another
State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." 3 2 The
close tailoring of the eleventh amendment to article III certainly
suggests that the eleventh amendment was only designed to strip
the federal courts of their power to hear cases involving a state
and citizens of another or foreign state. The eleventh amend29. See, e.g., Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98
(1984). In Pennhurst, the Court observed that "federal jurisdiction over suits
against unconsenting States 'was not contemplated by the Constitution when
establishing the judicial power of the United States.' .. . In short, the principle
of sovereign immunity is a constitutional limitation on the federal judicial power
established in Art. III ......
Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Hans v. Louisiana,
134 U.S. 1, 15 (1890)). See also Employees v. Missouri Dep't of Pub. Health &
Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 291-92 (1973) (Marshall, J., concurring); Ex parte New
York, 256 U.S. 490, 497 (1921).
In addition to the theoretical problems of state amenability to suit in federal
court, a number of practical problems are presented in a dual system of government if one body is allowed to entertain an action in which the other political
unit is involved. One significant problem involves enforcement of a judgment
against a state. See THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 549 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed.
1961) ("To what purpose would it be to authorize suits against states, for the
debts they owe? How could recoveries be enforced?"); 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES at
527 (1941) (G. Mason) ("A power which cannot be executed ought not to be
granted"); Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 482
(1987); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 13 (1890). This problem, of course, is
presented in an action permitted under one of the exceptions to the eleventh
amendment bar.
30. See, e.g., Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 286-87
(1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Fletcher, supra note 24, at 1060 ("if they intended the [eleventh] amendment to forbid [federal-question suits], their drafting was extraordinarily inept.").
31. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
32. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. But cf. Gunter v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co.,
200 U.S. 273, 284 (1906); Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447 (1883) ("The
immunity from suit belonging to a State, which is respected and protected by the
Constitution within the limits of the judicial power of the United States, is a
personal privilege which it may waive at pleasure; so that in a suit, otherwise well
brought, in which a State had sufficient interest to entitle it to become a party
defendant, its appearance in a court of the United States would be a voluntary
submission to its jurisdiction .... ").
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ment, however, has been characterized variously as "a jurisdictional bar, an exemplification of sovereign immunity, [and] an
embodiment of federalist ideals of state sovereignty." 33
Although the language of the amendment is simple on its
face, it has been enlarged and restricted by a line of decisions to
its present-day position. The Court has expanded the protection
of the amendment by barring suits against a state by its own citizens involving a federal question.3 4 The Court has restricted the
amendment's protection by allowing federal courts to hear suits
against states in two situations: (1) When the state has consented
to the suit;3 5 and, (2) when Congress has abrogated the eleventh
amendment protection by providing that the states may be held
liable.3 6 The remainder of this section of the article examines the
expansion and contraction of the eleventh amendment, and its
corresponding effect on the federal courts' jurisdiction.
A.

The Hans v. Louisiana Decision
The Court expanded the scope of the eleventh amendment

33. Massey, supra note 6, at 63-64 n. 15. See also supra note 32 and accompanying text (describing the amendment as a waivable privilege).
34. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15 (1890). The holding in Hans has
even been expanded to include other actions against states. Jackson, The Supreme
Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and State Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE L.J. 1, 3 n.4
(1988) ("state cannot be sued without its consent by foreign state") (citing Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934) (suits against states by foreign states
barred); Ex parte New York, No. 1, 256 U.S. 490 (1921) (suits against states in
admiralty barred)).
35. See, e.g., Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184 (1964).
36. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
A third exception to the eleventh amendment restriction of federal jurisdiction was created in Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). The Court there was
faced with the issue of whether a federal court could enjoin the Attorney General of Minnesota from enforcing a state law claimed to be unconstitutional. Id.
at 149. The Court held that federal courts could enjoin such action, reasoning:
If the act which the state Attorney General seeks to enforce be a violation of the Federal Constitution, the officer in proceeding under such
enactment comes into conflict with the superior authority of that Constitution, and he is in that case stripped of his official or representative
character and is subjected in his person to the consequences of his individual conduct. The State has no power to impart to him any immunity
from responsibility to the supreme authority of the United States.
Id. at 159-60 (citing In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 507 (1887)).
The Court further defined this exception in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S.
651 (1974). There, the Court held that a federal court could gralit relief under
Exparte Young only to the extent that such relief was prospective in nature. Id. at
668-69. See also Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 348 (1979) (availability of retroactive relief left to the states not the federal courts); Massey, supra note 6, at 6970; Note, Reconciling Federalism and Individual Rights: The Burger Court's Treatment of
the Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendments, 68 VA. L. REV. 865, 870-71 (1982).
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in Hans v. Louisiana,3 7 by extending its jurisdictional bar to include suits against a state by its own citizens in an action involving
a federal question 3 8 Despite the plain language of the eleventh
amendment, the Court held that its significance did not lie in the
mere words, but in the fundamental principle of sovereign immunity which limits the federal courts' power under article III.39
Thus, the Court held that the literal terms of the amendment
must give way to the principle of sovereign immunity embodied
40
in the amendment.
The Chisholm and Hans decisions are at odds. In Chisholm, the
Court declined to read beneath the language of article III in pursuit of an implicit or inherent exception to federal jurisdiction for
suits involving states. 4 ' The Court in Hans, on the other hand,
had little difficulty finding that the language of the eleventh
amendment, which specifically repealed only two of the nine article III jurisdictional bases, contained principles of sovereign.-immunity which went beyond the actual language of the amendment
to implicitly bar suits between a state and its own citizens involv42
ing a federal question.
In addition, the two decisions have created a considerable
debate within the Court and among scholars as to the propriety of
the Court's holding in Hans.43 This debate has been extensively
37. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
38. Id. at 15. This expands the jurisdictional bar of the federal courts to
jurisdictional base number one under article III. For the text of article III, see
supra note 20 and accompanying text.
The Court in Hans was construing whether Louisiana could be amenable to
suit in federal court for an alleged violation of the contracts clause of the United
States Constitution, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. Hans, 134 U.S. at 10.
39. Hans, 134 U.S. at 15. See also Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub.
Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 472 (1987); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S.
234, 238 (1985); Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98
(1984).
40. Hans, 134 U.S. at 15.
41. Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 451.
42. Ham, 134 U.S. at 15. Cf. Marshall, supra note 28 at 1344 ("Pure textualism, however, is not the predominant mode of constitutional interpretation.
The reporters are replete with cases in which the Court has gone beyond the
apparent meaning of a constitutional provision and instilled it with meaning that
falls well outside the bounds of plausible reading.");'J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DISmTUST 16 (1980) ("the most important datum bearing on what was intended is the
constitutional language itself. This is especially true where the legislative history is
in unusual disarray .... ") (emphasis in original).
43. See Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468,
496 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens,
JJ.); Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 78 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined
by Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, IJ.); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon,
473 U.S. 234, 247-48 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall, Black-
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considered in other works 44 and an exhaustive discussion here
would prove unnecessary for a complete understanding of the issues presented in Union Gas.45 It is sufficient to understand the
two positions on this issue.
Four members of the Court- Justices Brennan, Marshall,
Blackmun, and Stevens- referred to by some as the revisionists, 4 6 believe that the Hans decision was incorrectly decided and
should be overturned. 4 7 This group 48 relies primarily on the language of the eleventh amendment and the debates surrounding
the ratification of the Constitution in support of its position.
Since the language of the eleventh amendment so closely tracks
the language of article III, they maintain, it was designed and intended to repeal only jurisdictional bases six and nine, not federal-question jurisdiction

as well. 4 9

In

addition,

this group

believes that, while some of the commentators' remarks prior to
ratification of the Constitution indicated that the states intended

to retain their sovereign immunity under the constitutional plan,
the majority did not.50
mun, and Stevens, JJ.); Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S.
89, 125 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 687
(1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Employees v. Missouri Dep't of Pub. Health &
Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 315-22 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
See also Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE LJ. 1425 (1987); Field,
supra note 28, at 538-40; Fletcher, supra note 24, at 1033; Gibbons, The Eleventh
Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation,83 COLUM. L. REV. 1889
(1983);Jackson, supra note 34, at 1; Lee, Sovereign Immunity and the Eleventh Amendment: The Uses of History, 18 URB. LAw. 519 (1986); Marshall, supra note 28, at
1342; Massey, supra note 6 at 61; Shapiro, Wrong Turns: The Eleventh Amendment
and the Pennhurst Case, 98 HARV. L. REv. 61 (1984); Tribe, IntergovernmentalImmunities in Litigation, Taxation, and Regulation: Separationof Powers Issues in Controversies About Federalism, 89 HARV. L. REV. 682 (1976).
44. For a list of the material in this area, see supra note 43.
45. A plurality of the Court in Union Gas did not address the continued validity of Hans since it found that, assuming that the eleventh amendment protects
states against federal-question suits, the states consented to suit in federal court
when they granted Congress the power to regulate interstate commerce under
article I of the Constitution. Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2286.
46. See Massey, supra note 6, at 62.
47. For a list of the decisions in which this group has written, see supra note
43.
48. This author concurs with professor Massey's assertion that "[tihe 'revisionists' are not a monolithic bloc; no suggestion is made here that each revisionist shares all the views of the other revisionists." Massey, supra note 6, at 62
n.9.
49. See, e.g., Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 259 (1985)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Nor, given the limited terms in which it was written,
could the Amendment's narrow and technical language be understood to have
instituted a sweeping new limitation on the federal judicial power whenever an
individual attempts to sue a State."). See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
50. In his dissenting opinion in Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1991

11

Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 1, Iss. 1 [1991], Art. 6

208

VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. I: p. 197

The other group- Chief Justice Rhenquist and Justices
White, O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy 5 1- believes in the continued validity of Hans. 52 While they agree that the evidence that the
U.S. 234 (1985), Justice Brennan examined a number of commentators' remarks
on the state-citizen diversity clause prior to ratification of the Constitution, including discussion by George Mason, John Madison, Patrick Henry, Edmund
Pendleton, John Marshall, and Edmund Randolph. Id. at 264-69. Justice Brennan concluded that, while "[t]he Madison and Marshall remarks have been cited
as evidence of an inherent limitation on Article III jurisdiction ... they were a
minority of those given at the Convention." Id. at 269. See also Welch v. Texas
Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 496 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ.). For example, Patrick
Henry, an opponent of ratification, stated:
"As to controversies between a state and the citizens of another state,
[Madison's] construction of it is to me perfectly incomprehensible. He
says it will seldom happen that a state has such demands on individuals.
There is nothing to warrant such an assertion. But he says that the
state may be plaintiff only. If gentlemen pervert the most clear expressions, and the usual meaning of the language of the people, there is an
end of all argument. What says the paper? That it shall have cognizance of controversies between a state and citizens of another state
without discriminating between plaintiff and defendant. What says the
honorable gentleman? The contrary- that the state can only be plaintiff. When the state is debtor, there is no reciprocity. It seems to me
that gentlemen may put what construction they please on it. What is
justice to be done to one party, and not to the other? If gentlemen take
this liberty now, what will they not do when our rights and liberties are
in their power."
Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 266-67 (quoting 3 ELLioT's DEBATES 543 (1941)).
In addition, Justice Brennan noted that, while the debates focused not on
federal-question jurisdiction but on state-citizen jurisdiction:
[T]he apparent willingness of many delegates to read the state-citizen
clause as abrogating sovereign immunity in state-law causes of action
suggests that they would have been even more willing to permit suits
against States in federal-question cases, where Congress had authorized such suits in the exercise of its Article I or other powers.
Id. at 264.
51. This group has been referred to as adhering to the "conventional doctrine." See Massey, supra note 6, at 62. Justice Powell was among this group and
wrote the plurality opinion in Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp.,
483 U.S. 468 (1987).
In his dissenting opinion in Union Gas, Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Kennedy, asserted his belief in the continued validity of Hans. Union Gas, 109 S. Ct.
at 2296-99 (Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by the Chief Justice and O'Connor and
Kennedy, JJ.). Although Justice White did not join this part of Justice Scalia's
opinion, it is presumed that he would vote to uphold Hans if the issue were
dispositive since he has so held in the past. See, e.g., Welch v. Texas Dep't of
Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468 (1987).
52. See, e.g., Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2296-99; Welch v. Texas Dep't of
Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 495 (1987) (Powell, J., joined by the
Chief Justice and Justices White and O'Connor, Jj.); Atascadero State Hosp. v.
Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 244 n.3 (1985) ("Justice Brennan long has maintained
that the settled view of Hans v. Louisiana, as established in the holdings and reasoning of the above cited cases, is wrong. ... It is a view, of course, that he is
entitled to hold. But the Court has never accepted it, and we see no reason to
make a further response to the scholarly, 55-page elaboration of it today.").
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states did not surrender their sovereign immunity under the Constitution is not so overwhelming as was once believed,5 3 they believe that the contrary evidence is not so clear either and that the
principle of stare decisis requires that Hans be followed.5 4
While the evidence that the revisionists muster in support of
their claim that Hans was incorrectly decided is beyond the scope
53. After reviewing the statements of the commentators on this issue made
prior to ratification, Justice Powell concluded that "[a]t most, then, the historical
materials show that- to the extent this question was debated- the intentions of
the Framers and Ratifiers were ambiguous." Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways
& Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 483-84 (1987).
The most frequently cited passage in support of the fact that the states
never intended to surrender their sovereign immunity when creating the federal
judiciary is Alexander Hamilton's Federalist Paper Number 81:
Though it may rather be a digression from the immediate subject of
this paper, I shall take occasion to mention here, a supposition which
has excited some alarm upon very mistaken grounds: It has been suggested that an assignment of the public securities of one state to the
citizens of another, would enable them to prosecute that state in the
federal courts for the amount of those securities. A suggestion which
the following considerations prove to be without foundation.
It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty, not to be amenable to
the suit of an individual without its consent. This is the general sense and
the general practice of mankind; and the exemption, as one of the attributes of sovereignty, is now enjoyed by the government of every
state in the union. Unless therefore, there is a surrender of this immunity in the plan of the convention, it will remain with the states, and the
danger intimated must be merely ideal. The circumstances which are
necessary to produce an alienation of state sovereignty, were discussed
in considering the article of taxation, and need not be repeated here. A
recurrence to the principles there established will satisfy us, that there
is no colour to pretend that the state governments, would by the adoption of that plan, be divested of the privilege of paying their own debts
in their own way, free from every constraint but that which flows from
the obligations of good faith. The contracts between a nation and individuals are only binding on the conscience of the sovereign, and have
no pretensions to a compulsive force. They confer no right of action
independent of the sovereign will. To what purpose would it be to authorize suits against states, for the debts they owe? How could recoveries be enforced? It is evident that it could not be done without
waging war against the contracting state; and to ascribe to the federal
courts, by mere implication, and in destruction of a pre-existing right of
the state governments, a power which would involve such a consequence, would be altogether forced and unwarrantable.
THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 548-49 (A. Hamilton) (. Cooke ed. 1961).
54. In Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468
(1987), Justice Powell claims that overruling Hans would involve overruling
some 17 other cases in addition to Hans itself. Id. at 494 n.27. See also Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 243 n.3 (1985). But see Jackson,
supra note 34 at 119-20 (stating that Justice Powell's figures are overblown).
Ironically, Justice Powell and the plurality in Welch overruled part of their
decision in Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184 (1964), and two sentences later
state that the decision to overrule Hans "depends in large part on adherence to
the doctrine of stare decisis."

Welch, 483 U.S. at 478-79.
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of this article, the evidence clearly indicates that Hans should be
overturned. The most prudent tack for the Supreme Court would
be to overrule Hans and interpret the eleventh amendment as the
language reads- federal jurisdiction does not extend to suits
against states by citizens of other states or foreign countries. 55
The bulk of the evidence indicates that this was the original intent
of the amendment, and such an interpretation is consonant with
the plain language of the amendment. If the states believe that
amenability to suit in federal court in cases involving the Constitution or laws of the United States is repugnant to principles of
federalism and state sovereignty, they may simply amend the
Constitution and strip the federal courts of their jurisdiction over
these cases. This is exactly what occurred in the aftermath of
Chisholm; the plain language of article III was read exactly as it
provided, and the states reacted by repealing those two jurisdic56
tional bases.
Although the issue of whether to uphold Hans was presented
to the Court in Union Gas, a plurality of the Court declined to
address it, and instead found that Congress, by enacting CERCLA, as amended by SARA, had stripped the states' immunity
under the eleventh amendment and that Congress had this power
under the commerce clause. 57 Thus, although the revisionists
won a small victory, in that liability may be imposed on the states
under CERCLA, the Hans decision remains. Undoubtedly, the
55. See also Massey, supra note 6, at 65; Fletcher, supra note 24, at 1062.
56. The dissent in Union Gas stated that its reluctance to overturn Hans was
based on the doctrine of stare decisis. While this doctrine is an important jurisprudential tenet, it is an unpersuasive basis to follow an incorrectly decided
opinion into its second century. Cf. Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212
(1984) ("Although adherence to precedent is not rigidly required in constitutional cases, any departure from the doctrine of staredecisis demands special justification."). Likewise unconvincing is the dissent's contention that it would be
unreasonable to overturn Hans after Congress had proceeded on the premise of
its continued validity for nearly a century. Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2298. See also
Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 495-96 (1987)
(ScaliaJ., concurring). If this were a convincing justification for not overturning
a prior decision, no decision would ever be overturned.
57. Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2286 ("Given our ruling in favor of Union Gas,
we need not reach its argument that Hans... should be overruled."). This is the
tack the Third Circuit took when presented with the case. United States v.
Union Gas Co., 832 F.2d 1343, 1354 (3d Cir. 1987), aff'd 109 S. Ct. 2273 (1989).
See also Massey, supra note 6, at 148 (listing this result as one of options facing
Court in Union Gas). Other circuit courts have followed this same tack in other
areas: McVey Trucking, Inc. v. Illinois (in re McVey Trucking, Inc.), 812 F.2d 311
(7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 895 (1987); County of Monroe v. Florida,
678 F.2d 1124 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1104 (1983); Peel v. Florida
Dep't of Transp., 600 F.2d 1070 (5th Cir. 1979); Mills Music, Inc. v. Arizona,
591 F.2d 1278 (9th Cir. 1979).
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Hans decision will continue to spark lively debate within the Court
and among authorities.
B.

STATE CONSENT TO Surr IN FEDERAL COURT

A state may consent to suit in federal court in one of two
ways. First, a state may "expressly" consent to suit in federal
court. 58 For example, a state will be found to have expressly con59
sented to suit in federal court when it appears in the suit. Second, a state may "implicitly" consent to suit in federal court.6c
For example, a state will be held to have implicitly consented to
suit in federal court when it acts in an area regulated by Congress
where Congress has expressly provided that the states may be
6
held liable in federal court. '
1. Express Consent
Although the eleventh amendment may be considered a jurisdictional bar,62 the Supreme Court has long held that a state
may waive this defect and confer jurisdiction on the federal
courts. 63 This position is an anomaly in constitutional law since,
in all other cases, parties may not expand the federal courts' article III jurisdiction by simply consenting to the suit in federal
58. See, e.g., Curran v. Arkansas, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 304, 309 (1853).
59. See, e.g., Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275,
276 (1959) (eleventh amendment provides "an immunity which a State may
waive at its pleasure.., as by a general appearance in litigation in a federal court
.") (citing Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447-48 (1883)).
60. See, e.g., Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S.
468 (1987); Employees v. Missouri Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S.
279 (1973); Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184 (1964).
61. Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468
(1987).
62. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
63. See, e.g., Curran v. Arkansas, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 304, 309 (1853). See also
Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 473 (1987);
Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184, 196 (1964); Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri
Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275, 276 (1959); Gunter v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R.
Co., 200 U.S. 273, 284 (1906); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 17 (1890); Clark v.
Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447 (1883); THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 548 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961) ("It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty, not to be
amenable to the suit of an individual without its consent."). Consent may, however, be unilaterally revoked by the state. Beers v. Arkansas, 61 U.S. (20 How.)
527, 529 (1857) (state "may withdraw its consent whenever it may suppose that
justice to the public requires it."); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 17 (1890).
A state's sovereign immunity not only dictates whether it may be sued, but
where it may be sued. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S.
89, 99 (1984). Thus, a state may consent to suit in state court, while preserving
its immunity in federal court, and vice versa.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1991

15

Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 1, Iss. 1 [1991], Art. 6

212

VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. I: p. 197

court. 64 Since the eleventh amendment can be viewed as restricting the federal courts' jurisdiction, it would appear that the states
may not expand the federal courts' jurisdiction simply by consent. 65 Such action is effectively a unilateral constitutional
amendment, normally requiring ratification by the legislatures of
three quarters of the states.6 Notwithstanding this anomolism,
the court adheres to its position that the federal courts may hear
67
suits by citizens against consenting states.
2. Implicit Consent
The Court has also developed an exception to the eleventh
amendment bar where a state implicitly consents to suit in federal
court.68 In Parden v. Terminal Railway, 69 the Court was presented
with the issue of whether a state-owned and -operated railway
could be sued by its employees in federal court on a cause of action expressly created by Congress. 70 The employees of the rail64. See, e.g., People's Bank v. Calhoun, 102 U.S. 256, 260-61 (1880) ("It
needs no citation of authorities to show that the mere consent of parties cannot
confer upon a court of the United States the jurisdiction to hear and decide a
case. If this were once conceded, the Federal courts would become the common
resort of persons who have no right, either under the Constitution or laws of the

United States, to litigate in those courts.").
See also Massey, supra note 6, at 63. Professor Massey notes that one justification for this anomaly is that the eleventh amendment is not a jurisdictional
barrier, but is simply a waivable immunity granted to the states. Id. at 63 n. 15.
As professor Massey appropriately points out, however, this characterization has

never been embraced by the Supreme Court, "which continues to characterize
the amendment as alternatively a jurisdictional bar, an exemplification of sovereign immunity, or an embodiment of federalist ideals of state sovereignty." Id.
at 64 n. 15. For cases characterizing the eleventh amendment as a waivable privilege, see supra note 32. Cf Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2286-89 (Stevens, J., concurring) (describing the "two eleventh amendments": (1) the literal terms, which
may not be waived; and, (2) the construed terms, which may be waived and
abrogated).
65. See Massey, supra note 6, at 66 ("Since the jurisdictional denial is constitutionally mandated, parties may not confer jurisdiction by waiver .....
66. U.S. CoNsT. art. V.
67. See, e.g., Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S.
468, 473 (1987); Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985); Atascadero State
Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238 (1985); Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v.
Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99 (1984).
68. This doctrine is also called "waiver." See, e.g., Welch v. Texas Dep't of
Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 473-74 (1987).
69. 377 U.S. 184 (1964).
70. Id. at 184. Although the Court in Hans interpreted the eleventh amendment to include suits against a state by its own citizens under the Constitution or
laws of the United States, Hans, 134 U.S. at 15, Hans involved a suit under the
Constitution and Parden was the first case involving a "suit brought on a cause of
action expressly created by Congress." Parden, 377 U.S. at 187. But see Union
Gas, 109 S.Ct. at 2299 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("In Hans, as here, there was a
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way brought suit in federal court under the Federal Employers'
Liability Act of 1908, 7 1 alleging injuries sustained while employed
by the railway.7 2 The statute provided that " 'every common carrier by railroad while engaging in commerce between any of the
several States.. . shall be liable in damages to any person suffering injury while he is employed by such carrier in such commerce,' and that 'under this chapter an action may be brought in a
district court of the United States . . . ,,"7
The Court determined that Congress had the power to abrogate the states' sovereign immunity because the states had necessarily "surrendered a portion of their sovereignty when they
granted Congress the power to regulate commerce." 74 The
Court considered the balance of power between the federal and
state governments and observed that a state's operation of a railway system in interstate commerce:
"[M]ust be in subordination to the power to regulate interstate commerce, which has been granted specifically
to the national government. The sovereign power of the
states is necessarily diminished to the extent of the
grants of power to the federal government in the Constitution .... [T]here is no such limitation upon the plenary power to regulate commerce [as there is upon the
federal power to tax state instrumentalities]. The state
can no more deny the power if its exercise has been au75
thorized by Congress than can an individual."
The Court then fashioned a pseudo-syllogistic analysis, which
the author has termed the "implicit-consent doctrine":
By adopting and ratifying the Commerce Clause, the
States empowered Congress to create such a right of action against interstate railroads; by enacting the FELA in
the exercise of this power, Congress conditioned the
right to operate a railroad in interstate commerce upon
congressional statute that could be pointed to as eliminating state sovereign immunity- namely, the Judiciary Act of 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470, which
gave United States courts jurisdiction over cases involving federal questions.").
71. Act of Apr. 22, 1908, Pub. L. No. 100, 35 Stat. 65 (codified as amended
45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1982)).
72. Parden, 377 U.S. at 184-85.
73. Id. at 185-86 (quoting 45 U.S.C. §§ 51 & 56).
74. Id. at 191.
75. Id. at 191-92 (quoting United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175, 184-85
(1936)).
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amenability to suit in federal court as provided by the
Act; by thereafter operating a railroad in interstate commerce, Alabama must be taken to have accepted that
76
condition and thus to have consented to suit.

More succinctly, the doctrine may be phrased as follows: Because the states empowered Congress to regulate interstate commerce, a state implicitly consents to suit in federal court when it
acts in an area which Congress has regulated pursuant to that
power."7 This test requires no evidence that Congress intended
to abrogate the states' immunity, but simply that Congress regulated a certain activity and a state's activities were of the sort regulated by Congress. 7 8 Moreover, the Court held that "we should
not presume to say, in the absence of express provision to the
contrary, that . . . [Congress] intended to exclude a particular
79
group of such workers from the benefits conferred by the Act."
Thus, under the analytical framework in Parden, a state may be
liable under any and every federal statute, unless the statute ex80
pressly excludes states from liability.
The Court considered essentially the same issue in Employees
v. Missouri Department of Public Health and Welfare. 8 1 That case involved an action by state employees against the state under the
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA) 82 for overtime compen76. Id. at 192.
77. Cf. Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468,
475 n.5 (1987) ("the Constitution authorizes Congress to regulate matters
within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, either under the Commerce
Clause or the Necessary and Proper Clause. . . . By ratifying the Constitution,
the argument runs, the States necessarily consented to suit in federal court with
respect to enactments under either Clause.") (citing D. ROBERTSON, ADMIRALTY

AND FEDERALISM 142-45 (1970)).
78. In fact, the statutory language involved in Parden was devoid of language indicating Congress's intent to strip the states of the protection given
under the eleventh amendment. For the text of the statutory language involved
in Parden, see supra note 73 and accompanying text. But see Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,
427 U.S. 445 (1976). In Fitzpatick, the Court asserted that the distinction between Parden and Employees v. Missouri Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411
U.S. 279 (1973), was that congressional authorization to sue the states in federal
court was present in Parden, but lacking in Employees. Id. at 452. The Court then
stated that the congressional authorization in Parden was the power of Congress
under the commerce clause of the Constitution. Id. Oddly, the Court in Fitzpatrick failed to observe that the act involved in Employees was based on the commerce clause as well.
79. Parden, 377 U.S. at 190.
80. This would be the states' potential liability if Hans were overruled.
81. 411 U.S. 279 (1973).
82. Act of June 25, 1938, Pub. L. No. 718, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified as
amended 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
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sation under section 16(b) 8 3 and other costs.8 4 The Court was
faced with the issue of whether the states were amenable to suit in
85
federal court under FLSA.
The Court first examined the language of FLSA and concluded that the states, acting as employers, were generally subject
to the provisions of the Act.8 6 The Court then examined section
16(b) of FLSA, which provides:
"Any employer who violates the provisions of section 6
or section 7 of this Act shall be liable to the employee or
employees affected in the amount of their unpaid minimum wages, or their unpaid overtime compensation, as
the case may be, and in an additional equal amount as
liquidated damages. Action to recover such liability may
be maintained in any court of competent jurisdiction
"87

Under the Parden analysis, any state that violated FLSA would
be held to have implicitly consented to suit under this provision
since it does not specifically exclude the states from coverage. 8 8
The Court in Employees, however, distinguished Parden by observing that that case involved the state operation of a railway system,
which is normally a proprietary operation, while the case before it
involved mental hospitals, state cancer hospitals, and training
schools for delinquent girls, which are generally not proprietary
operations.8 9 The Court was concerned that the scope of a contrary holding might "implicate elevator operators, janitors,
charwomen, security guards, secretaries, and the like in every office building in a State's governmental hierarchy." 90 The Court
83. Present version at 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).
t 84. Employees, 411 U.S. at 281. The employees also sought an amount equal
to their overtime compensation as liquidated damages plus attorneys' fees. Id.
85. Id. at 283.
86. Id. at 282-83. The Act prior to 1966 had excluded states from its provisions. In 1966, however, section 3(d) was amended to provide that states were
excluded from the provisions "(except with respect to employees of a State, or
political subdivision thereof, employed (1) in a hospital, institution, or school
referred to in the last sentence of subsection (r) of this section .... )." Act of
Sept. 23, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-601, § 102(b), 80 Stat. 830, 831 (present version
at 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (1982)). The last sentence of section 3(r) covers the operation of hospitals, institutes for the mentally and physically handicapped and
institutes for learning. 29 U.S.C. § 203(r).
87. Employees, 411 U.S. at 283 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)).
88. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
89. Employees, 411 U.S. at 284.
90. Id. at 285.
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held that such a far-reaching result required a more definitive articulation by Congress of its intent to strip the states of their sovereign immunity under the eleventh amendment. 9 1
By requiring that Congress indicate its intent to strip the
states of their immunity with greater specificity, the Court destroyed the fundamental logic in the Parden decision. 9 2 Under
Parden, the specificity with which Congress speaks is wholly irrelevant; all that was considered was whether Congress had provided
a cause of action and whether the state had acted in the regulated
area. Although the degree of specificity with which Congress has
spoken may go to whether the state has notice that it may be held
to have consented to suit in federal court, it is irrelevant to the
analytical framework established in Parden.
A substantial blow to the Parden decision came in Welch v.
Texas Department of Highways and Public Transportation.9" The Court
in Welch was faced with essentially the same issue it faced in
Parden: Whether a state has implicitly consented to suit when operating an automobile and passenger ferry under the Jones Act,9
which applied the remedial provisions of the Federal Employers'
96
Liability Act of 1908, 95 the Act involved in Parden, to seamen.
After reviewing Employees and other subsequent decisions which
held that congressional intent must be apparent before the states
will be held to have waived their immunity,9 7 the Court held that
91. Id. "[Wle decline to extend Parden to cover every exercise by Congress
of its commerce power, where the purpose of Congress to give force to the
Supremacy Clause by lifting the sovereignty of the States and putting the States
on the same footing as other employers is not clear." Id. at 286-87.
While the implications of a contrary holding are far-reaching, the underlying distinction between the two activities is elusive. The Court suggests that
Congress need not speak definitively where a small number of state employees
are involved, but must speak specifically where a large number of state employees are implicated; analytically, such a distinction is meaningless.

92. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974) ("Constructive consent is not a doctrine commonly associated with the surrender of constitutional
rights, and we see no place for it here. In deciding whether a State has waived
its constitutional protection under the Eleventh Amendment, we will find waiver
only where stated 'by the most express language or by such overwhelming implications from the text as [will] leave no room for any other reasonable construction.' ") (quoting Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co., 213 U.S. 151, 171 (1909)).
93. 483 U.S. 468 (1987).
94. Act of Mar. 4, 1915, Pub. L. No. 302, 38 Stat. 1164 (codified as
amended 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1982)).
95. Act of Apr. 22, 1908, Pub. L. No. 100, 35 Stat. 65 (codified as amended
45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1982)).
96. Welch, 483 U.S. at 471. See 46 U.S.C. § 688(a) (applying remedial provisions of Federal Employers' Liability Act to seamen).
97. The Court reviewed Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234
(1985), and Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979).
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"to the extent that Parden v. Terminal Railway . . . is inconsistent
with the requirement that an abrogation of Eleventh Amendment
immunity by Congress must
be expressed in unmistakably clear
98
language, it is overruled."
Thus, today's doctrine of implicit consent emerged: A state
will be held to have implicitly consented to suit in federal court
only where Congress has unequivocally indicated its intent to
hold states amenable to suit and the state has acted in the regulated area. 99
C.

CONGRESSIONAL ABROGATION OF ELEVENTH AMENDMENT
PROTECTION

Another exception to the eleventh amendment's bar to federal court jurisdiction is where Congress has abrogated the states'
eleventh amendment protection.1°° In Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,' 0 the
Court considered whether Congress had the power to abrogate
the states' eleventh amendment protection when it provided a
cause of action against the states in the 1972 amendments to Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.102 The Court recognized that.,
although all power begins with the states, " 'every addition of
power to the general government involves a corresponding diminution of the governmental powers of the States.' "103 Consider98. Welch, 483 U.S. at 478 (footnote omitted).
99. Justice Scalia's dissent in Union Gas, which is joined by the ChiefJustice
and Justices O'Connor and Kennedy, would overrule Parden entirely and completely do away with the implicit-consent doctrine. Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at
2302-03.
100. This action can be viewed as repealing the eleventh amendment,
which should be subject to the normal requirements of a constitutional amendment, but instead is accomplished by the requirements of a simple legislative
enactment. Compare U.S. CONST. art. V (requiring ratification "by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths
thereof .... ") with U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7 (requiring mere majority of House and
Senate to pass a law). Cf supra note 66 and accompanying text (allowing states
to confer jurisdiction on federal courts by consent effectively allows states to
unilaterally repeal eleventh amendment).
101. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
102. Id. at 448. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 can found at: Act of July 2,
1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971
to 2000h-6 (1982 & Supp. V 1987)). The 1972 amendments to the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 can be found in the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972,
Act of Mar. 24, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (codified in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971 to 2000h-6 (1982 & Supp. V 1987)). For the provisions involved in Fitzpatrick, see Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 448-49 nn. 1-2.
103. Id. at 455 (quoting Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346 (1880)). Cf
U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.").
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ing the relationship between the enforcement provisions of the
fourteenth amendment' 0 4 and the immunity provided under the
eleventh amendment, the Court concluded:
[W]e think that the Eleventh Amendment, and the principle of state sovereignty which it embodies ... are necessarily limited by the enforcement provisions of § 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment. In that section Congress is

expressly granted authority to enforce "by appropriate
legislation" the substantive provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which themselves embody significant limitations on state authority. When Congress acts pursuant
to § 5, not only is it exercising legislative authority that is
plenary within the terms of the constitutional grant, it is
exercising that authority under one section of a constitutional Amendment whose other sections by their own
terms embody limitations on state authority. 0 5
Thus, when acting pursuant to its power under section 5 of
the fourteenth amendment, Congress has the power to abrogate
the states' eleventh amendment immunity. As in Parden, however,
the Court failed to express the degree of specificity with which
Congress must speak when it abrogates the states' sovereign immunity under the eleventh amendment.
In Quern v. Jordan,'0 6 the Court reexamined the issues it had
considered in Fitzpatrick. Examining the language of section 1 of
the Civil Rights Act of 1871,10 7 the Court held that section 1
evinced no congressional intent to abrogate the states' sovereign
immunity and thus, the states were not amenable to suit in federal
court under that statute.10 8 Citing its decision in Employees, the
104. Section 5 of the fourteenth amendment provides that "[tjhe Congress
shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this
article." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
105. Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 456.

106. 440 U.S. 332 (1979).
107. Act of Apr. 20, 1871, Pub. L. No. 1, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (present version at
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982)).
108. Quern, 440 U.S. at 343. In support of this conclusion, the Court noted:
Given the importance of the States' traditional sovereign immunity, if
in fact the Members of the 42d Congress believed that § 1 of the 1871
Act overrode that immunity, surely there would have been lengthy debate on this point and it would have been paraded out by the opponents of the Act along with the other evils that they thought would
result from the Act. Instead, § 1 passed with only limited debate and
not one Member of Congress mentioned the Eleventh Amendment or
the direct financial consequences to the States of enacting § 1. We can
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Court then observed that "[o]ur cases consistently have required
a clearer showing of congressional purpose to abrogate Eleventh
Amendment immunity than our Brother Brennan is able to
marshal." 1
Thus, the doctrine of congressional abrogation of the states'
eleventh amendment immunity emerged: The states are amenable to suit in federal court where Congress has so indicated by
clear and unmistakable language. The distinction between congressional abrogation of state sovereign immunity and the implicit-consent doctrine is considered toward the end of this
article. ' 10
III.

THE PENNSYLVANIA V. UNION GAS CO. CASE

The Union Gas decision involves essentially two issues: (1)
whether Congress expressed a clear intent to strip the states of
their eleventh amendment immunity under CERCLA, as
amended by SARA; and, (2) whether Congress has such power
when legislating pursuant to the commerce clause of article I of
the Constitution."' Answering both of these in the affirmative,
five Justices found that the states may be liable in suits by private
individuals for damages. These issues so divided the Court, however, that five Justices felt compelled to express their views, the
result being a different five-to-four split on each issue.' 12
The various opinions are as follows: (1) Justice Brennan
wrote the opinion of the Court on the first issue and was joined by
Justices Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens, and Scalia, and was joined
on the second issue by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens;"13 (2) Justice Stevens wrote an opinion concurring in the
only conclude that this silence on the matter is itself a significant indication of the legislative intent of § 1.

Id.
109. Id. (citing Employees, 411 U.S. 279).
110. See infra notes 247-57 and accompanying text.
11. Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2276.
112. Although the various opinions are listed below, this summary is helpful: (1) On the issue of whether Congress had clearly indicated its intent to strip
the states of their eleventh amendment immunity: (a) Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens, and Scalia believed that Congress had indicated its
intent; while (b) the Chief Justice and Justices White, O'Connor, and Kennedy
believed that it had not; and (2) on the issue of whether Congress had the power
to do this under its article I commerce clause power: (a) Justice Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens, and White believed that it did; while (b) the ChiefJustice and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy believed that it did not.
113. Id. at 2276.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1991

23

Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 1, Iss. 1 [1991], Art. 6

220

VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. I: p. 197

judgment;' 14 (3) Justice White wrote an opinion in which he disagreed with Justice Brennan on the first issue and was joined by
the Chief Justice and Justices O'Connor and Kennedy, and wrote
a decision in which he agreed with Justice Brennan on the second
issue;" 15 (4) Justice Scalia wrote an opinion in which he concurred
with Justice Brennan's analysis on the first issue, and wrote an
opinion in which he was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices
O'Connor and Kennedy, in which he disagreed with Justice Brennan on the second issue;" 6 and, (5) Justice O'Connor wrote an
opinion in which she simply stated that she joined with Justice
White on the first issue and joined with Justice Scalia on the second issue."1 7 This section of the article will examine each issue in
turn and the various opinions on that issue.
A.

THE FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Between 1890 and 1948, the predecessors of the Union Gas
Company owned and operated a carburated water-gas plant near
the Brodhead Creek in Stroudsburg, Pennsylvania."" A byproduct of this operation was coal tar, which was dumped on the
premises. I 9 In 1953 and 1970, Union Gas sold part of its land to
the Pennsylvania Power and Light Company, which in turn
granted easements to the Borough of Stroudsburg. l2 0 In early
1980, the Borough of Stroudsburg assigned its easements over to
2
the state of Pennsylvania.'1 '
On October 7, 1980, while excavating part of the Brodhead
Creek as part of a flood-control program, the state struck a large
deposit of coal tar, which began seeping into the creek.' 22 After
the Environmental Protection Agency was alerted to the problem,
it determined that the coal tar was a hazardous substance and de3
clared the site to be the first Superfund cleanup site.'
114. Id. at 2286.
115. Id. at 2289.

116. Id. at 2295.
117. Id. at 2303.
118. Id. at 2276.
119. United States v. Union Gas Co., 792 F.2d 372, 374 (3d Cir. 1986), aff'd
109 S. Ct. 2273 (1989).
120. Id.

121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2276. As the Third Circuit observed, the
"Brodhead Creek thus had the dubious distinction of being the first Superfund
site in the nation." United States v. Union Gas Co., 792 F.2d 372, 374 n.1 (3d
Cir. 1986).
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After cleaning up the site,'12 4 the United States brought suit
against Union Gas under sections 104125 and 107126 of CERCLA
to recoup its costs incurred in the cleanup.12 7 Union Gas filed a
third-party complaint against Pennsylvania, claiming that it was
liable for at least part of the cleanup costs as an owner or operator of the facility and because it was negligent in its excavation of
the Brodhead Creek.128 Pennsylvania claimed that the eleventh
amendment barred the action and the district court dismissed the
third-party complaint.' 29 The United States then amended its
complaint against Union Gas, and Union Gas filed an amended
third-party complaint against Pennsylvania. 3 0 The district court
again dismissed Union Gas's third-party complaint, holding that
the eleventh amendment barred the action.' 3 '
Union Gas appealed the district court's dismissal of its thirdparty complaint, and the Third Circuit affirmed, finding no clear
indication of congressional intent under CERCLA to strip the
states of their eleventh amendment immunity. 3 2 While Union
Gas's petition for certiorari was pending before the Supreme

Court, Congress passed the SARA amendments to CERCLA. l33
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and vacated the Third Circuit's decision for reconsideration in light of these amendments.'

s4

The Third Circuit, on remand, determined that the

SARA amendments to CERCLA evinced a clear intent to hold
states liable under its provisions and that Congress had this
124. The United States and Pennsylvania worked together to clean up the
site, and the United States reimbursed the state for all its costs. United States v.
Union Gas Co., 832 F.2d 1343, 1345 (3d Cir. 1987).
125. 42 U.S.C. § 9604. Section 104 of CERCLA provides that the President is authorized to remove any hazardous substance which is released or
threatened to be released into the environment. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1).
126. 42 U.S.C. § 9607. Section 107 of CERCLA provides that "the owner
and operator of a vessel or a facility . . . shall be liable for- (A) all costs of
removal or remedial action incurred by the United States .....
42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(a)(1).
127. Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2276-77.
128. Id. at 2277.
129. United States v. Union Gas Co., 575 F. Supp. 949 (E.D. Pa. 1983), aff'd
792 F.2d 372 (3d Cir. 1986).
130. United States v. Union Gas Co., 792 F.2d 372, 375 (3d Cir. 1986).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 383.
133. Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2277. See Act of Oct. 17, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99499, 100 Stat. 1613 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675
(Supp. IV 1986)).
134. Union Gas Co. v. Pennsylvania, 479 U.S. 1025 (1987).
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35
power under the commerce clause in article I.1
Pennsylvania
3 6
petitioned for certiorari,1 and, as described below, the Supreme
Court affirmed.

B.

THE LANGUAGE OF CERCLA, AS AMENDED BY SARA

The issue of whether Congress had specifically articulated its
intent to strip the states of their sovereign immunity under CERCLA,as amended by SARA, was addressed first since an answer
in the negative would obviate deciding the constitutional issue of
whether Congress had the power to strip the states of their sovereign immunity when legislating pursuant to the commerce clause
7
of article I.'3
1.

Justice Brennan's Opinion

Justice Brennan began by observing that, under section 107
of CERCLA, both "persons" and "owners and operators" may be
held liable under the Act.' 3 8 Justice Brennan then noted that the
states are included in the definition of "person" found in section
101 (21),139 which provides that "[t]he term 'person' means an individual, firm, corporation, association, partnership, consortium,
joint venture, commercial entity, United States Government,
State, municipality, commission, political subdivision of a State,
or any interstate body."' 40 Section 101(21) was not amended in
the 1986 SARA amendments and, in its first round with this case,
135.
aff'd 109
136.
137.
138.

United States v. Union Gas Co., 832 F.2d 1343, 1357 (3d Cir. 1987),
S.Ct. 2273 (1989).
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 485 U.S. 958 (1988).
Union Gas, 109 S.Ct. at 2277.
Id. Section 107 provides:
(1) [T~he owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged
for disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport
for disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed
by such person, by any other party or entity, at any facility or incineration vessel owned or operated by another party or entity and containing
such hazardous substances, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances
for transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or
sites selected by such person, from which there is a release, or a
threatened release which causes the incurrence of response costs, of a
hazardous substance, shall be liablefor ....
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (emphasis added).
139. Union Gas, 109 S.Ct. at 2277.
140. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21).
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the Third Circuit held that it was an insufficient indication of con14
gressional intent to hold the states liable under CERCLA. 1
Justice Brennan, however, concluded that the SARA amendments added a sufficient indication of Congress's intent to abrogate the states' immunity. Section 101(20)(D) was added in the
SARA amendments, and provides:
The term "owner or operator" does not include a unit of
State or local government which acquired ownership or
control involuntarily through bankruptcy, tax delinquency, abandonment, or other circumstances in which
the government involuntarily acquires title by virtue of
its function as sovereign. The exclusion provided under
this paragraph shall not apply to any State or local government which has caused or contributed to the release
or threatened release of a hazardous substance from the
facility, and such a State or local government shall be
subject to the provisions of this chapter in the same manner and to the same extent, both procedurally and substantively, as any nongovernmental entity, including
42
liability under section 9607 of this title.'
Justice Brennan concluded that the exclusion from liability in
section 101(20)(D) would be unnecessary had Congress not considered that the states could be liable in private suits under the
provisions of CERCLA. 14 3 Section 107(d)(2), Justice Brennan
noted, buttressed his conclusion that SARA furnished the necessary indication of congressional intent to hold states liable under
CERCLA.144 That section provides:
No State or local government shall be liable under this
141. See United States v. Union Gas Co., 792 F.2d 372, 379 (3d Cir. 1986)
(court found that statutory provisions in CERCLA under sections 107 and
101(21) were similar to provisions involved in Employees, which Supreme Court
found insufficient to strip states of their eleventh amendment immunity). See also
United States v. Union Gas Co., 575 F. Supp. 949 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (no clear
indication of congressional intent to hold states liable under CERCLA).
142. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(D). The provision in section 101(20)(D) is an
exception to the definition in section 101(20)(A), which provides:
The term 'owner or operator' means... (iii) in the case of any facility,
title or control of which was conveyed due to bankruptcy, foreclosure,
tax delinquency, abandonment, or similar means to a unit of State or
local government, any person who owned, operated or otherwise controlled activities at such facility immediately beforehand.
42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A).
143. Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2278.
144. Id.
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subchapter for costs or damages as a result of actions
taken in response to an emergency created by the release
or threatened release of a hazardous substance generated by or from a facility owned by another person. This
paragraph shall not preclude liability for costs or damages as a result of gross negligence or intentional mis45
conduct by the State or local government.'
Justice Brennan concluded that "Congress need not exempt
States from liability unless they would otherwise be liable."' 46 In
addition, he concluded that section 310 of CERCLA, permitting
citizens suits, further supported this finding.' 47 That section provides that citizens may bring suits "against any person (including
the United States and any other governmental instrumentality or
agency, to the extent permitted by the eleventh amendment to
the Constitution) .. .."148 Justice Brennan concluded that "[t]he
reservation of States' rights under the Eleventh Amendment
would be unnecessary if Congress had not elsewhere in the statute overridden the States' immunity from suit."'

49

Finally, Justice Brennan found that the language in section
120(a)(l), added in the SARA amendments, supported his conclusion that the language in section 101(20)(D) was intended to
strip the states of their eleventh amendment protection.' 5 0 Section 120(a)(l) provides:
Each department, agency, and instrumentality of the
United States (including the executive, legislative, and
judicial branches of government) shall be subject to, and
comply with this chapter in the same manner and to the
same extent, both procedurally and substantively, as any
nongovernmental entity, including liability under section
9607 of this title.'15
This section closely mirrors the language in section 101(20)(D),
which applies to states. ' 5 2 Since the language of section 120(a) (1)
145. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(d)(2).

146. Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2278.
147. Id. at 2279.
148. 42 U.S.C. § 9659(a)(1). This section was not added in the SARA
amendments to CERCLA.
149. Union Gas, 109 S.Ct. at 2279.
150. id

151. 42 U.S.C. § 9620(a)(1).
152. For the text of section 101(20)(D), see supra note 142 and accompanying text.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol1/iss1/6

28

Toland: Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Company: A Private Cause of Action agai

1990]

PENNSYLVANIA

V. UNION GAS COMPANY

225

,i

could mean nothing less than a waiver of the federal government's immunity, Justice Brennan concluded, the similar provision in section 101(20) (D) likewise was an abrogation of the state
1 53
governments' immunity.
Pennsylvania argued to the Court that, while the language of
CERCLA, as amended by SARA, did indicate that the states may
be liable to the United States, it did not indicate that the states
may be liable to private entities.' 5 4 Justice Brennan found that,
although such an interpretation would not render the definition
of person in section 101 (21) meaningless, it would render meaningless the provision in section 101(20)(D) which provides that
the states shall be liable "to the same extent, both procedurally and
substantively, as any nongovernmental entity, including liability
under section 9607 of this title."' 5 5 Since no authorization for
suits by the United States against the states is necessary, ' 5 6 Justice
Brennan concluded that the provision in section 101(20)(D)
would be superfluous under Pennsylvania's suggested interpretation.' 57 According to this reasoning, Justice Brennan concluded
that "the language of CERCLA as amended by SARA clearly
evinces an intent to hold States liable in damages in federal
court."1

58

2. Justice White's Opinion
Justice White split his analysis of the statutory language into
an analysis of CERCLA as it existed prior to the SARA amendments, and the SARA amendments themselves. At the outset,
Justice White observed that " 'Congress must express its intention to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment in unmistakable lan-

guage in the statute itself.'

"59

Justice White began his analysis of CERCLA by considering
153. Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2279.
154. Id. Pennsylvania relied on Employees, in which the Court held that,
although the language of the Fair Labor Standards Act did not permit suits by
private individuals, "the statute's explicit inclusion of state-run hospitals among
those to whom the law would apply was not meaningless: since the statute allowed the United States to sue, the inclusion of States within the entities covered
by the statute served to permit suits by the United States against the States."
Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2279 (citing Employees, 411 U.S. at 285-86).
155. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(D) (emphasis added). Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at
2279.
156. See, e.g., United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128, 140-41 (1965).
157. Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2280.
158. Id. (footnote omitted).
159. Id. at 2289 (quoting Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234,
243 (1985)).
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the provision in section 101(21) which defines "person" to include states.1' ° This provision, he found, was not a sufficiently
clear indication of Congress's intent to strip the states of their
sovereign immunity.' 6 ' Justice White first observed that three of
the four judges considering this language in the initial consideration of the case found that this provision was not a sufficiently
clear indication of congressional intent to abrogate the states' im-

munity, and thus, the provision could not be said to be unmistakably clear. 162 In addition, Justice White concluded that, since that
definitional section also defined "person" to include the United

States, it would be wholly redundant for Congress to hold the
states and the United States liable under that provision since a
63
separate provision provided for suits against the United States.1

Finally, Justice White concluded that the provision in CERCLA defining "person" to include states was indistinguishable
from the provision involved in Employees. 164 In Employees, the sec-

tion defining employer to include states was held to subject the
states to suit in federal court by the federal government, but not
to suit by private individuals.' 65 This conclusion, Justice White
determined, was appropriate for the provisions involved in CERCIA as well.'66 Anything else, he maintained, would require a
clearer statement than that included in section 101(21).167

Justice White then turned to the provisions added in the
SARA amendments to CERCLA.'6 Justice White read section
101 (20) (D) to indicate that states and local governmental entities
would be liable under section 107, but only to the United States
and not private individuals.' 69 Justice White determined that sec160. Id. For the text of section 101 (21), see supra note 140 and accompanying text.
161. Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2290.
162. Id. at 2290. Justice White was referring to the district and circuit
courts' decisions: United States v. Union Gas Co., 575 F. Supp. 949 (E.D. Pa.
1983) (Bechtle, J.); United States v. Union Gas Co., 792 F.2d 372 (3d Cir. 1986)
(Weis & Becker, Ji., affirming; Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
163. Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2290. Justice White was referring to section
107(g), which provides: "For provisions relating to Federal agencies, see section
9620 of this title." 42 U.S.C. § 9 6 07(g). For the text of section 120, see supra
note 151 and accompanying text.
164. Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2291. For the text of the provisions involved
in Employees, see supra note 86.
165. Employees, 411 U.S. at 285-86.
166. Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2291.
167. Id. at 2292.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 2290. For the text of section 101(20)(D), see supra note 142 and
accompanying text.
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tion 101(20)(D) was an unlikely provision to abrogate eleventh
amendment protection since it applies only to facilities that a state
acquires involuntarily by virtue of the state's function as sovereign.17 0 Since that section only applies to facilities acquired by
the states involuntarily, the states' immunity would only be abrogated with respect to those sites, and not any sites that the state
owned and operated by choice.' 7' This conclusion, Justice White
found, was exactly opposite from what one would expect Congress to do; one would expect the states to be subject to suit for
their proprietary operation of hazardous-waste sites while exempt
72
from suit for sites acquired involuntarily.
Justice White concluded, however, that the provision in section 101(20)(D) did have meaning if construed to make the states
liable to the United States, the conclusion that the Court reached
in Employees.' 7 3 While no congressional authorization is required
for suit by the United States against a state, 74 Justice White
found that section 101(20)(D) was not superfluous since it exempted states from suit by the United States in certain situations,
for example, in cases where the state became an involuntary
owner.1 75 This, Justice White concluded, was exactly what the
Court faced in Employees, and the same result was appropriate in
76
this case.
In conclusion, Justice White quoted Edelman v. Jordan, 7 7 in
which the Court observed that a waiver of immunity would only
be found " 'where stated' by the most express language or by
such overwhelming implications from the text as [will] leave no
room for any other reasonable construction of the statute in question." 78 Since it was reasonable to construe that Congress simply
170. Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2292-93.
171. Id. at 2293.
172. Id. Justice White addressed Justice Brennan's explanation of this provision, which was that this part of section 101 (20)(D) "explains and qualifies the
entire definition of 'owner or operator'- not just that part of the definition applicable to involuntary owners." Id. at 2280. Justice White observed that this
analysis was wrong since the second sentence of section 101 (20)(D), which imposes liability on states, exists only as an exception to the first sentence of section
101(20)(D), which excepts states from liability where they acquired the site involuntarily. Id.
173. Union Gas, 109 S.Ct. at 2293.
174. See, e.g., United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128, 140-41 (1965).
175. Union Gas, 109 S.Ct. at 2293.
176. Id.
177. 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
178. Union Gas, 109 S.Ct. at 2294 (quoting Edelman, 415 U.S. at 673 (quoting Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co., 213 U.S. 151, 171 (1909))).
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intended to hold states liable to the federal government and not
private individuals, Justice White concluded that it was inappropriate to hold that Congress had abrogated the states' eleventh
79
amendment protection under CERCLA, as amended by SARA.'
B.

THE

ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND THE COMMERCE CLAUSE

1. Justice Brennan's Opinion
Since Justice Brennan found a clear congressional intent to
abrogate the states' immunity, he proceeded to the constitutional
issue of whether Congress has such power under the commerce
clause of article I. Justice Brennan began by examining Parden
and Employees, the message of which, he found, was that "the
power to regulate commerce includes the power to override
States' immunity from suit, but we will not conclude that Con-

gress has overridden this immunity unless it does so clearly."'

80

Quoting from Fitzpatrick,Justice Brennan considered the general principle of federalism that " 'every addition of power to the
general government involves a corresponding diminution of the
governmental powers of the States. It is carved out of them.' "181
This proposition, he determined, applied with equal force to
Congress's article I powers as it did to its power under section 5
of the fourteenth amendment.' 82 Justice Brennan then turned to

Justice Scalia's assertion in his dissent that " '[n]othing in [Fitzpatrick '] reasoning justifies limitation of the principle embodied in
the Eleventh Amendment through appeal to antecedent provisions of the Constitution.' -18s
In response, Justice Brennan
stated that, according to the dissent, theprinciples embodied in the
179. Id.
180. Id. at 2281. Justice Brennan also noted that, since the decision in Employees, the Court had twice assumed that Congress had the power to override
the states' immunity under the commerce clause. Id. (citing Welch, 483 U.S. at
475-76; County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 252 (1985)).
Justice Brennan also noted that every Court of Appeals to address this issue had
concluded that Congress had such power. Id. (citing United States v. Union Gas
Co., 832 F.2d 1343 (3d Cir. 1987); McVey Trucking, Inc. v. Illinois (in re McVey
Trucking, Inc.), 812 F.2d 311 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 895 (1987);
County of Monroe v. Florida, 678 F.2d 1124 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1104 (1983); Peel v. Florida Dep't of Transp., 600 F.2d 1070 (5th Cir. 1979);
Mills Music, Inc. v. Arizona, 591 F.2d 1278 (9th Cir. 1979)).
181. Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2282 (quoting Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 455
(quoting Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346 (1880))).
182. Id. The legislation involved in Fitzpatrick was enacted pursuant to
Congress's enforcement power in section 5 of the fourteenth amendment.
183. Union Gas, 109 S.Ct. at 2283 (quotingJustice Scalia's dissent, 109 S.
Ct. at 2302). Justice Scalia was concerned that, if Congress were allowed to abrogate the states' sovereign immunity under any and all of its article I powers,
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eleventh amendment predated the constitution itself, and thus,
the commerce clause was not antecedent to the principles embodied in the eleventh amendment, but was subsequent to those principles. i8 4 Thus, he concluded, the dissent could not properly rely
85
on chronology in distinguishing Fitzpatick.'
In part B of section III, Justice Brennan reviewed general
principles of federalism and revisited the implicit-consent doctrine. 18 6 Noting that the grant to Congress under the commerce
clause is plenary, he observed:
Because the Commerce Clause withholds power from
the States at the same time as it confers it on Congress,
and because the congressional power thus conferred
would be incomplete without the authority to render
States liable in damages, it must be that, to the extent
that the States gave Congress the authority to regulate
commerce, they also relinquished their immunity where
Congress found it necessary, in exercising this authority,
87
to render them liable.'
Thus, Justice Brennan revived the implicit-consent doctrine and
held that "[tihe States held liable under such a congressional enactment are thus not 'unconsenting'; they gave their consent all at
once, in ratifying the Constitution containing the Commerce
88
Clause, rather than on a case-by-case basis."'
the doctrine of sovereign immunity would become a "practical nullity." Id. at
2302.
184. Id. at 2283.
185. Id. Justice Brennan noted that "[elven if 'the principle embodied in
the Eleventh Amendment' made its first appearance at the same moment as the
Commerce Clause, and not before, the dissent could no longer rely on chronology in distinguishing Fitzpatrick." Id.
In addition, Justice Brennan noted that the chronology of provisions would
only make a difference if the eleventh amendment changed the state of affairs;
i.e., that the commerce clause had permitted Congress to abrogate the states'
sovereign immunity prior to the eleventh amendment. Justice Brennan observed that this analysis was untenable, however, because:
The language of the Eleventh Amendment gives us no hint that it limits
congressional authority; it refers only to "the judicial power" and forbids
"constru[ingf' that power to extend to the enumerated suits- language
plainly intended to rein in the judiciary, not Congress. It would be a
fragile Constitution indeed if subsequent amendments could, without
express reference, be interpreted to wipe out the original understanding of congressional power.
Id.
186. ld. at 2284-86. For a discussion of the implicit-consent doctrine,' see
supra notes 68-99 and accompanying text.
187. Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2284.
188. Id.
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This proposition- that the grant of commerce clause power
without the power to provide for suit against the states in federal
court would be incomplete- is at the heart of Justice Brennan's
opinion. For example, Justice Brennan observed that Congress's
article I commerce clause power has been construed to be extremely broad.' 8 9 This power, he observed, has also been construed to displace "state authority even where Congress has
chosen not to act,"' 90 and that it "sometimes precludes state regulation even though existing federal law does not pre-empt it
....,191 Accordingly, he found that, if Congress were not permit-

ted to create a cause of action against the states for money dam92
ages in interstate commerce, no one could.'
Justice Brennan concluded by addressing Pennsylvania's argument that article III does not permit Congress to provide an
action against the states in federal court without their consent
since this effectively allows Congress to improperly expand the
federal courts' jurisdiction. 93 Justice Brennan rejected Pennsylvania's argument on two grounds. First, he recited the implicit-consent doctrine: "[I]n approving the commerce power, the
States consented to suits against them based on congressionally
created causes of action."'1
Second, Justice Brennan cited Fitzpatrick in support of the proposition that Congress may provide
for a damages action against the states under the fourteenth
amendment, and that this does not expand the federal courts' article III jurisdiction. 19 5 Thus, Justice Brennan concluded that
Congress may provide for suits against the states in federal court
189. Id. (citing NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937);
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 11I (1942); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294
(1964)).
190. Id. (citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824); Missouri
Pac. R.R. Co. v. Stroud, 267 U.S. 404 (1925); Northwest Cent. Pipeline Corp. v.
State Corp. Comm'n, 109 S.Ct. 1262 (1989)).
191. Id. (citing Philadelphia v. NewJersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978); Northwest
Cent. Pipeline Corp. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 109 S.Ct. 1262 (1989)).
192. Id. Justice Brennan observed that local attempts to deal with environmental problems have been invalidated under the commerce clause. Id. (citing
Philadelphia v. NewJersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978) (NewJersey's exclusion of outof-state waste violated commerce clause)). Thus, he concluded, "we often must
look to the Federal Government for environmental solutions. And often those
solutions, to be satisfactory, must include a cause of action for money damages."
Id. at 2285. For a discussion of the Philadelphiav. Newjersey case and the restrictions on local regulation of environmental problems, see generally Celebrezze,
State Solid Waste Regulation and the Commerce Clause: Ohio's Initiative on a National
Problem, 1 V.I.E.W. PROC. 49 (1988).
193. Union Gas, 109 S.Ct. at 2285. See also supra note 100.
194. Union Gas, 109 S.Ct. at 2285.
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under the commerce clause because the states implicitly consented to such suit by granting Congress the power to regulate
commerce in article I, which includes the essential authority to
96
hold the states liable for damages in federal court.1
2. Justice Stevens's Opinion
AlthoughJustice Stevens joined injustice Brennan's opinion,
he wrote a concurring opinion to set forth his views on the eleventh amendment. Justice Stevens started by noting the difference
between the "two eleventh amendments": The first one is the literal language of the amendment, which restricts the power of the
federal judiciary; and the second is the concept of sovereign immunity against federal-question cases embodied in the amendment, which began with Hans.' 9 7 Justice Stevens stated that
Congress could not abrogate the protection in the former since it
cannot amend the Constitution by a simple legislative enactment.' 98 He concluded that the latter, however, could be abrogated by Congress since it is merely a judicially created
doctrine.199 Justice Stevens further supported his proposition
that the limitation on the federal courts' power to entertain federal-question suits against states is not embodied in the literal
eleventh amendment by noting that the states may waive their immunity and consent to suit in federal court while other parties
2 °°
may not.
Finally, Justice Stevens noted that the decision in Edelman
buttressed his proposition that the immunity involved in federalquestion cases is not under the eleventh amendment, but is a judicially created doctrine.2 0 ' In Edelman, the Court held that the
196. Id. at 2286.
197. Id. For a discussion of Hans, see supra notes 37-40 and accompanying
text.
198. Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2286.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 2287 (citing Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S.
365, 377 n.21 (1978); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 398 (1975); California v.
LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 112 n.3 (1972); American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Finn, 341
U.S. 6, 17-18 & n.17 (1951); Mitchell v. Maurer, 293 U.S. 237, 244 (1934);Jackson v. Ashton, 33 U.S. 148, 149 (1834)).
Justice Stevens failed to recognize, however, that the Court has held that the
states may consent to suit in federal court in cases between a state and a citizen
of another state, contrary to the direct proscription contained in the eleventh
amendment. See, e.g., Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447 (1883). Thus, it is not
only federal-question cases in which the states have been found to have consented to jurisdiction.
201. Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2287.
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eleventh amendment did not proscribe suits against state officials
acting in their official capacity, so long as the relief granted was
prospective. 20 2 Justice Stevens observed, "[i]fEdelman simply involved an application of the limitation on judicial power contained in the Eleventh Amendment, once judicial power was
found to exist to award prospective relief. . . it is difficult to understand why that same judicial power would not extend to award
other forms of relief." 20 3 In conclusion, Justice Stevens declared
that "Congress is not superseding a constitutional provision in
these cases, but rather is setting aside the Court's assessment of
the extent to which the use of constitutionally prescribed federal
2 °4
authority is prudent."
3. Justice Scalia's Opinion
In part II of his opinion, Justice Scalia took the opportunity
to comment on the continued validity of Hans.20 5 Justice Scalia
adopted the reasoning in Welch, and rejected the argument that
the Constitution contained a waiver of state immunity against
suits involving federal questions. 2° 6 Since the federal government did not surrender its sovereign immunity under the constitution,2 0 7 Justice Scalia saw no reason to believe that the states
surrendered their sovereign immunity to suits by citizens for violations of federal laws or the Constitution. 20 8 In addition, Justice
Scalia found that certain relief from violations of federal law was
available, which somewhat obviated the need to allow suits
2 °9
against the states.
202. Edelman, 415 U.S. at 665. For a discussion of Edelman and the allowance of prospective relief against the states, see supra note 36.
203. Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2287.
204. Id. at 2289.
205. Id. at 2299. Since part II ofJustice Scalia's opinion was joined byJustice Kennedy, it appears that the Court is now split five-to-four on whether to
overrule Hans: Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens would overrule the decision, while the ChiefJustice and Justices White, O'Connor, Scalia,
and Kennedy support the decision.
206. Id. at 2297-98.
207. See, e.g., United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399 (1976).
208. Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2298. Justice Scalia buttressed this conclusion
by noting that, if anything, suits against the federal government would be more
important since "suits against the States for violation of the Constitution or laws
can at least be brought by the Federal Government itself ... " ld. (citing United
States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128, 140-41 (1965)).
209. Id. (citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (federal courts may
enjoin state official's violations of federal law); Monell v. New York City Dep't of
Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (money damages are available against county
and municipal officials)).
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Justice Scalia also found that, even if he were wrong in his
analysis that the states' did not surrender their sovereign immunity under the Constitution, the issue was a close one.2 10 Since
the issue was so close, he maintained, it would be improper to
1
overrule a decision that has been the law for a full century. 2 ' Reversing Hans, Justice Scalia noted, would involve reversing seventeen other decisions that relied on its validity. 21 2 In addition, he
found that forty-nine Congresses had proceeded believing in the
continued validity of Hans.213 Accordingly, Justice Scalia, joined
by the Chief Justice and Justices O'Connor and Kennedy, "de21 4
cline[d] respondents' invitation to overrule Hans v. Louisiana."
In part III of his opinion, Justice Scalia began by reviewing
various decisions in which the Court had held that principles of
federalism guaranteed the states' their right to sovereign immunity. 215 For example, Justice Scalia quoted the following passage:
"The 'constitutionally mandated balance of power'
between the States and the Federal Government was
adopted by the Framers to ensure the protection of
'our fundamental liberties.' By guaranteeing the sovereign immunity of the States against suit in federal court,
the Eleventh Amendment serves to maintain this
2 16
balance."
Justice Scalia then rejected the proposition that Congress
had the power under article I to strip the states of this immunity. 21 7 Justice Scalia reasoned that any analysis of the states' surrender of sovereign immunity must begin with article III -of the
Constitution, and not article 1.218 To allow federal jurisdiction
210. Id.
211. Id. See also Welch, 483 U.S. at 496 (Scalia, J., concurring).
212. Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2298 (citing Welch, 483 U.S. at 494 n.27). But
see Jackson, supra note 34, at 119-20 (stating that Justice Powell's same figure in
Welch was exaggerated).
213. Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2298. This reasoning, however, would prevent
the Court from ever overruling any decision. While the decision in Parden has
not been the law as long as the Hans decision, it is entirely possible that Congress has relied on it over the last quarter century. Notwithstanding, Justice
Scalia evidenced little hesitation in maintaining that Parden should be entirely
overruled. See Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2303.
214. Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2299.
215. Id. at 2299-300.
216. Id. at 2300 (quoting Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234,
242 (1985) (citation omitted) (quoting Garcia v. San Antonio Met. Transit Auth.,
469 U.S. 528, 547 (1985) (Powell, J., dissenting))).
217. Id. at 2301.
218. Id. Justice Scalia observed that "[w]hen we have turned to consider
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over any action under which Congress has power to legislate
under article I, he concluded, would exceed the federal courts'

21 9
jurisdiction under the Constitutional plan.

Justice Scalia placed particular emphasis on the chronology
of the constitutional provisions involved. 22 0 First, he recognized
that Congress has the power to strip the states of their eleventh
amendment immunity when legislating pursuant to the enforcement provision of the fourteenth amendment because the provisions of that amendment "'were intended to be, what they really
are, limitations of the power of the States and enlargements of the
power of Congress.' "221 He concluded that "[niothing in this
reasoning justifies limitation of the principle embodied in the
Eleventh Amendment through appeal to antecedent provisions of
the Constitution."

222

In part IV of his opinion, Justice Scalia expressly rejected the
implicit-consent doctrine adopted in Parden, and would overrule
that decision entirely. 22 3 Justice Scalia first observed that "all federal prescriptions are, insofar as their prospective application is
concerned, in a sense conditional, and- to the extent that the
objects of the prescriptions consciously engage in the activity or
hold the status that produces liability- can be redescribed as invitations to 'waiver.' "224 Thus, he concluded, there is little difference between the proposition that a state has waived its sovereign
immunity by engaging in regulated activities or finding that Congress has abrogated the states' sovereign immunity. 225 That
proposition- that Congress can abrogate the states' sovereign
immunity under its article I powers- he stated, was exactly what
whether 'a surrender of [state] immunity [is inherent] in the plan of the conven-

tion,' we have discussed that issue under the rubricof the various grants ofjurisdiction
in Article III, seeking to determine which of those grants must reasonably be
thought to include suits against the States." Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting
Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 328-30 (1934)).
219. Id.
220. Id. He states, for example: "We have never gone thumbing through
the Constitution, to see what other original grants of authority- as opposed to
Amendments adopted after the Eleventh Amendmenttion of state sovereign immunity." Id.

might justify elimina-

221. Id. at 2302 (quoting Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 456 (quoting Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 399, 345 (1880))).
222. Id.
223. Id. at 2302-03. Noting that the Court in Welch overruled Parden to the
extent that it did not require a clear articulation of Congress's intent to strip the
states of their eleventh amendment immunity, Justice Scalia stated that he

"would drop the other shoe." Id. at 2303.
224. Id. at 2303.
225. Id.
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he had rejected earlier in his opinion.226
IV.

ANALYSIS

This section of this article examines the various issues involved in the Union Gas decision. First, this section considers the
language in CERCLA, as amended by SARA, and whether it provides the required unmistakably clear indication of congressional
intent to strip the states of their eleventh amendment protection.
Second, the article examines the eleventh amendment issues and
suggests some needed resolutions.
A.

THE LANGUAGE OF

CERCLA,

AS AMENDED BY

SARA

This author finds no unmistakably clear language that Congress intended to hold the states liable in federal court to private
individuals. While the author disagrees with Justice White's statutory analysis, 22 7 it is submitted that he reaches the correct result:
CERCLA, as amended by SARA, evinces Congress's intent to
hold the states liable to suit by the United States, but not necessarily private individuals.
The polestar for this analysis is that the statutory language
must state Congress's intent " 'to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment in unmistakable language in the statute itself.' "228 Likewise, Congress must indicate its intent " 'by the most express
language or by such overwhelming implications from the text as
[will] leave no room for any other reasonable construction.' "229
Section 101(21) of CERCLA defines "person" to include
states.2 3 0 Without more, of course, this provision is insufficient to
hold the states liable to suit in federal court. 231 The next section
relied on by the majority in Union Gas is section 101(20)(D).232
226. Id.
227. Instead of considering CERCLA in its present form, i.e., as amended
by SARA, Justice White first examined CERCILA before the SARA amendments,
and then the SARA amendments separately. Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2289-94.
As Justice Scalia observed, piecemeal statutory construction is not a traditional,
nor effective, method of ascertaining congressional intent. Id. at 2295-96.
228. Welch, 483 U.S. at 474 (quoting Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon,

473 U.S. 234, 243 (1985)).
229. Edelman, 415 U.S. at 673 (quoting Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co., 213
U.S. 151, 171 (1909)).
230. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21). For the text of section 101(21), see supra note
140 and accompanying text.
231. See, e.g., Employees, 411 U.S. at 285-86.
232. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(D). For the text of section 101(20)(D), see supra
note 142 and accompanying text.
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That section first excludes the states from liability where they
have acquired a facility involuntarily.2 3 3 Section 101 (20)(D) then
provides that such exclusion does not apply where the state has
caused or contributed to a release and that such state shall be
subject to the provisions of CERCLA "to the same extent" as
nongovernmental entities. 23 4 This language does not unmistakably indicate that Congress intended to subject the states to private
suit in federal court.
The majority believes that the exclusion from liability in section 101(20) (D) would be unnecessary had Congress not intended to subject the states to suit elsewhere. 23 5 The flaw in this
analysis is that nowhere else in CERCLA does Congress provide
that the states shall be liable in private suits. While other provisions indicate that Congress intended the states to be liable to the
United States, nothing in them indicates an intent to allow private
suits against the states in federal court. 23 6 A perfectly reasonable
construction of such language is that Congress simply intended
the states to be subject to suit by the United States.
The majority rejects this construction, finding that no such
provision is necessary to effect such a result since no congressional authorization is necessary for suits by the United States
against the states.2 3 7 The majority claims that "Congress would
have had no cause to stress that States would be liable 'to the
same extent ... as any nongovernmental entity,' 238 . . .if it had
meant only that they could be liable to the United States." 23 9 It is
submitted that the majority's claim that this provision would be
rendered meaningless if CERCLA were interpreted to merely
hold the states liable to the United States is flawed for two
reasons.
First, as Justice White observed, the first sentence of section
101 (20)(D) provides an exception to the states' liability as owners
and operators. 24 0 To this extent, the provision has meaning if
interpreted that the states are only liable to the United States.
233. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(D).
234. Id.
235. Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2278.
236. For the text of other relevant provisions, see supra notes 145, 148 &
151 and accompanying text.
237. Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2280.

238. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(D).
239. Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2279 (citing United States v. Mississippi, 380

U.S. 128, 140-41 (1965) (footnote added)).
240. Id. at 2292. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(D).
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The second sentence then acts as an "exception to the exception"
contained in the first sentence; notwithstanding the first sentence,
a state will be liable if it causes or contributes to a release at an involuntarily acquired facility. This provision still has meaning if construed to only extend the states' liability to the United States: a
state will generally not be liable to the United States for a facility
acquired involuntarily unless the state causes or contributes to a
release.
Second, the majority's claim that section 101(20)(D) must indicate Congress's intent to provide a private cause of action
against the states since Congress need not provide that the states
shall be liable to the United States 24 ' erroneously presumes that
it would be entirely unreasonable for Congress to include any
provision that is unnecessary. This presumption is entirely unfounded; Congress frequently includes unnecessary provisions in
legislation. For example, numerous acts exist in which Congress
has specifically provided that the states shall be liable in citizens'
24 2
suits to the extent permitted under the eleventh amendment.
Unless Congress has indicated with unmistakably clear language
elsewhere in that legislation that the states are subject to private
suits, such language is entirely unnecessary since the eleventh
amendment acts as a limitation on state liability without any such
provision.
Accordingly, a reasonable reading of the language in CERCLA does not provide the requisite unmistakably clear indication
of Congress's intent to hold the states liable in private suits.
While the language in section 101 (20) (D) may be read that way, it
is entirely reasonable to read the language as providing an exception to federal liability in certain situations.

B.

THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT

1.

The Hans v. Louisiana Decision

It is also submitted that the Court should overrule the Hans
decision and allow federal courts to entertain suits against states
involving federal questions.2 43 The Court in Hans incorrectly
241. Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2279 (citing United States v. Mississippi, 380
U.S. 128, 140-41 (1965)).
242. See, e.g., section 20(a)(1)(B) of the Toxic Substances Control Act, 15
U.S.C. § 2619(a)(1)(B); section 304(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 7604(a)(1); section 1449(a)(1)(B) of the Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 300j-8(a)(l)(B).
243. For a discussion of the Hans decision, see supra notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
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found that the evidence indicated that the states had not intended
to surrender their sovereign immunity when granting the federal
judiciary its power under article III. As Justice Brennan has observed, the evidence in this area was anything but clear, and in
fact a majority believed that the states had surrendered their immunity under the Constitution. 4 4 In addition, this reading of the
eleventh amendment is consistent with its actual language. If the
states do not want to surrender their sovereign immunity with respect to federal-question cases, they may simply amend the Constitution to strip the federal courts of their jurisdiction over such
suits, as they did after Chisholm.
Justice Scalia and the dissent's belief that Hans should be upheld on the grounds that Congress has relied on its continued
validity for a full century is unfounded. 245 If Congress has so relied, and does not believe that the states should be subject to suit
in federal court in suits involving federal questions, the states may
simply reverse this result and strip the federal courts of this jurisdiction. While Congress's reliance on the Court's decisions is an
important consideration, it certainly is not controlling; such a rule
would forever bar the Court from reversing a decision. In addition, the dissent's concern that Congress has relied on Hans
seems somewhat disingenuous in light of the fact that they would
completely overrule Parden, which may well have been relied on
24 6
by Congress over the last quarter century.
2.

CongressionalAbrogation under Article I

If the Court eventually overrules Hans, whether Congress has
the power under its article I powers to abrogate the states' sovereign immunity would become a moot issue since the states would
be amenable to suit in all federal-question cases.2 4 7 The Hans decision remains intact, however, and this issue is not moot. The
244. See, e.g., Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 247 (1985)
(Brennan, J., dissenting). For a discussion of the material considered by Justice
Brennan in his dissent in Atascadero, see supra note 50.
245. See Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2298 (ScaliaJ., dissenting); Welch, 483 U.S.
at 496 (Scalia, J., concurring).
246. Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2303.
247. The only effective difference between the states' potential liability if
Hans were overruled and where Congress has abrogated their eleventh amendment protection is the specificity with which Congress must speak. When Congress abrogates the states' eleventh amendment protection under article I, it
must make its intent unmistakably clear. Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2281 ("the
power to regulate commerce includes the power to override States' immunity
from suit, but we will not conclude that Congress has overridden this immunity
unless it does so clearly."). If Hans were overruled, the states would be poten-
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related issue of whether any practical difference exists between
the implicit-consent doctrine and congressional abrogation of
state immunity is also presented in this discussion.
First, it is suggested that the Court should abolish the implicit-consent doctrine. As Justice Scalia observed, there is no difference- either conceptual or practical- between the implicitconsent doctrine and congressional abrogation of eleventh
amendment protection.2 48 Conceptually, congressional abrogation of immunity is premised on the grounds that the states gave
Congress the power to regulate in an area, and such delegation
included the power to hold the states liable in private suits. In
Fitzpatrick, for example, the Court held:
[W]e think that the Eleventh Amendment, and the principle of state sovereignty which it embodies ... are necessarily limited by the enforcement provisions of § 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment. In that section Congress is
expressly granted authority to enforce "by appropriate
legislation" the substantive provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which themselves embody significant limitations on state authority. When Congress acts pursuant
to § 5, not only is it exercising legislative authority that is
plenary within the terms of the constitutional grant, it is
exercising that authority under one section of a constitutional Amendment whose other sections by their own
terms embody limitations on state authority. 24 9
The implicit-consent doctrine is premised on similar grounds. In
Parden, the Court held that the state's operation of a railway system in interstate commerce:
"[M]ust be in subordination to the power to regulate interstate commerce, which has been granted specifically
to the national government. The sovereign power of the
states is necessarily diminished to the extent of the
grants of power to the federal government in the Constitially liable under every statute, regardless of the specificity with which Congress

has spoken. This may be one reason the Hans proponents support that decision.
248. Union Gas, 109 S.Ct. at 2303. Justice Scalia stated that, "to acknowledge that the Federal Government can make the waiver of state sovereign immunity a condition to the State's action in a field that Congress has authority to
regulate, is substantially the same as acknowledging that the Federal Government can eliminate state sovereign immunity in the exercise of its Article I powers .... . Id. (footnote omitted).
249. Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 456. This passage was quoted at note 105 and
is quoted here for comparison.
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tution ....
[T]here is no such limitation upon the plenary power to regulate commerce [as there is upon the
federal power to tax state instrumentalities]. The state
can no more deny the power if its exercise has been au250
thorized by Congress than can an individual.When these two passages are compared, it becomes readily apparent that the doctrines are fundamentally the same: notwithstanding the construed language of the eleventh amendment, the
states gave Congress the power to provide a private cause of action against the states.

In addition, no practical difference exists between the two
doctrines. For example, assume that a federal statute unequivocally provides that any state which violates a state-employee's

fourteenth amendment rights is subject to suit in federal court for
damages sustained by that employee. A violating state could be
held amenable to suit in federal court under either doctrine.
First, the requirement that Congress speak clearly is satisfied; a
requirement under both doctrines. Under the implicit-consent

doctrine announced in Parden, the state would be amenable since:
(1) The states gave Congress the power to regulate this activity in
section 5 of the fourteenth amendment; (2) Congress conditioned

employing citizens on amenability to suit in federal court; and, (3)
by engaging employees, the state implicitly consented to suit in
federal court. 25 ' Under the more straightforward analysis of congressional abrogation in Fitzpatrick, the state would be amenable
to suit since Congress spoke clearly to hold states amenable when

they violate the statute.
Since there is no effective or conceptual difference between
the two doctrines, it is submitted that one should be abandoned.
In addition, the Court has often confused the two doctrines, citing cases which apply the implicit-consent doctrine in support of
congressional abrogation and vice versa.2 52 This simply creates
additional confusion in this already confused area, which could
easily be avoided since both doctrines effect the same ultimate
250. Parden, 377 U.S. at 191-92 (quoting United States v. California, 279
U.S. 175, 184-85 (1936)).
251. This tracks the analysis used in the Parden decision. For the text of
that analysis, see supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
252. See, e.g., Welch, 483 U.S. 468, 478 (citing Quern for the proposition that
express congressional intent is required when considering the degree of specificity required under Parden); Quern, 440 U.S. 332, 343-44 (citing Employees when
discussing the specificity with which Congress must speak when abrogating
under Fitzpatrick).
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ends. Of the two, congressional abrogation is a more straight-forward approach and is favorable to the implicit-consent doctrine.
In addition, the "consent" involved in the implicit-consent doctrine is not the sort of consent associated with the proposition
that states may consent to suit in federal court or waive their sov2 53
ereign immunity.
If the implicit-consent doctrine is abandoned, the Court
would be faced with the issue that the dissent in Union Gas rejected: Whether Congress has the power under the commerce
clause in article I to abrogate the states' immunity under the eleventh amendment. 2 5 The answer to this question depends simply
on one's beliefs in the federalist system. If one believes that a
strong federal government- one that has the power to protect
the rights guaranteed under the Constitution- is appropriate,
then one allows such suits. If one believes that the states should
be allowed greater autonomy in their affairs, then one denies such
25 5
suits.
At this juncture, Justice Stevens's opinion is of import. If the
eleventh amendment barred federal courts from hearing suits
against states arising under the Constitution or laws of the United
States, Congress could not override this protection, regardless of
its specificity. Such a provision would be in direct violation of the
eleventh amendment and article V of the Constitution, 2 56 and
would be invalid. As Justice Stevens observes, however, the
states' protection against federal-question suits stems not from
the literal terms of the eleventh amendment, but is a judicial interpretation of such language. Since this protection is a judicial
253. See, e.g., Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447 (1883) ("The immunity
from suit belonging to a State, which is respected and protected by the Constitution within the limits of the judicial power of the United States, is a personal
privilege which it may waive at pleasure; so that in a suit, otherwise well brought,
in which a State had sufficient interest to entitle it to become a party defendant,
its appearance in a court of the United States would be a voluntary submission
to its jurisdiction .
254. The Court has only allowed a private cause of action against the states
premised on the commerce clause under the implicit-consent doctrine. See Union
Gas, 109 S. Ct. 2273; Parden, 377 U.S. 184. Cf. Welch, 483 U.S. at 475 (assuming
"without deciding or intimating a view of the question, that the authority of
Congress to subject unconsenting States to suit in federal court is not confined
to § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment"); County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 252 (1985).
255. Original intent- the oft ignored constitutional guidepost- indicates
that Congress does have the power to subject the states to suit in federal court.
For a discussion of the original intent surrounding the federal power to subject
the states to suit in federal court, see supra notes 37-54 and accompanying text.
256. For the text of article V, see supra note 66 and accompanying text.
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creation, any abrogation of it need not comport with the stric2 57
tures of the Constitution.
The federal and state governments are involved more than
ever in all areas of interstate commerce, and an integral part of
the federal government's power to regulate such activity is the
power to render the states amenable to suit in federal court. An
essential part of state accountability in federal court is liability for
damages in suits by private individuals.
Without the power to hold the states accountable for money
damages in private suits, Congress is deprived of one of its most
effective means of regulating interstate commerce. If only the
federal government is permitted to seek damages from the states,
private entities will only engage in commerce with the states to
the minimum extent necessary to reasonably conduct business.
This is particularly true when environmental considerations are
involved because of the potentially enormous liability for
cleanups.
State sovereign immunity, and federal sovereign immunity
for that matter, is an anachronism who's time has passed. Today's
business world requires private individuals to transact with the
states on numerous levels. To allow the states to freely conduct
business without any accountability cries for change. While this
author does not foresee the imminent fall of sovereign immunity,
or even the inevitable fall, it is appropriate that Congress have the
power to override such immunity when it deems necessary and
provide for private suits against the states for damages. While the
Supreme Court in Union Gas reached this result, its methodology,
viz. the implicit-consent doctrine, perpetuates strained and confused doctrines in this area that are in desperate need of a
cleanup.
V.

CONCLUSION

In closing, the Court's decision in Union Gas is attractive from
an environmentalist's standpoint since more state funds will now
be available for cleaning up toxic-waste sites. The decision is disturbing, however, for three reasons. First, the majority strains the
language of CERCLA, as amended by SARA, to find an unmistak257. Justice Stevens's analysis fails in only one respect. He maintains that
the fact that the states' protection against federal-question suits is judicially created allows the states to consent to suit. However, the states have been held to
have consented to suits involving citizens of other states, a direct prohibition in
the eleventh amendment. See Clark v. Barnard. 108 U.S. 436, 447 (1883).
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ably clear indication of congressional intent to allow private suits
against the states for damages. While this author is in favor of
such a result- and believes that Congress should so provide in
future legislation- he does not read the language of CERCLA, as
amended by SARA, to provide evidence of such an intent.
Second, the decision reveals the Court's two newest members' position on the issue of whether to continue to follow Hans.
Instead of overruling the incorrectly decided decision, the two
newest members unfortunately support the decision and all of its
attendant confusion. Finally, the Union Gas decision perpetuates
the confusing and unnecessary distinction between the implictconsent doctrine and congressional abrogation of state sovereign
immunity. A far more appealing and perspicuous avenue would
be to hold that Congress has the power under article I to render
the states liable to private suits in federal court for damages.
Robert Toland H
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